

The DNSEASY and SSR meetings in Rome

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- ▶ Organised by GCSEC <http://www.gcsec.org/> with ICANN and OARC

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- ▶ DNSSEC blunders propagation

Personal opinion

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- ▶ No clear definition of the public: some talks research, some ops, some tutorials

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- ▶ Under Chatham House Rule, so no name will be mentioned

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5. Other consequences (people using alternative resolvers, risk of false positives).

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Personal opinion

Nothing really new, well-rehearsed discussions